The Role of the International Community
By Liban Ahmad
libahm@gmail.com
OPINION
The role of the international community in Somalia’s post-transition politics seldom becomes a topic for discussion among Somalis. Somalia’s political leaders depend on the international community—the UN, AU, IGAD, the United Sates, the Arab League and European Union— not only for resources but for political relevance. Without the commitment of the international community Somali political leaders would not have facilitated the end of the transition and the emergence of a permanent government.
Fifty three years ago Somalis owed to themselves effort to create a post-colonial state. Now they owe a lot to the international community on the efforts to form and sustain a post-conflict state after state failure in 1991. AMISOM protects the Somali government against Al Shabaab and kicked Al Shabaab out of Mogadishu and several regions in the south to give Somali government the space and peace of mind to govern.
In an essay* published in Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, Cedric de Coning of Norwegian Institute of International Affairs discusses challenges Somalia’s post-transition government is facing in the form of “ transaction costs of needing to engage with each of these international actors. Instead of governing Somalia, the President and his cabinet are forced to meet with and react to each of the proposals offered by his country’s international partners.”
Ideally Somalia’s federal government should have privileges to which any government is entitled to represent its people and manage aid and reconstruction resources. The legacy the federal government inherited is a strong periphery and a weak centre: there are administrations that have have been functioning satisfactorily without relying on central government. The periphery has its tax regime, security forces and judiciary but the centre enjoys international community’ recognition of the executive and legislative federal institutions.
To overcome transaction costs the Somali government incurs in its dealings with the international community Dr Cedres de Coning suggests three steps: “First, external peacebuilders need to re-affirm the principle of local ownership and re-commit to make it the starting point of their approach to state- and peacebuilding. Secondly, international partners need help to recognise and acknowledge their role in undermining the resilience of the very fragile governments they are committed to help. Third[ly], external and internal peacebuilders need help to openly discuss their respective interests.”
It is not only the international community whose role may undermine a fragile government. The federal government’s desire to benefit from all the privileges associated with sovereignty at the expense of gradual, trust-building approach to political reconciliation undermines the effort to devise “home-grown context-specific solutions” advocated by Dr Cedres de Coning.
For the Somali government to realise its transformative potential the government leaders should have the initiative and courage to ask the right questions about post-transition Somalia. Questions leaders need to address range from sharing resources donated to Somalia to ensuring that the role of government is an enabling one , not constraining one.
Local stakeholders have been partners of the international community but the post-transition government is a new partner of the international community. By talking to local stakeholders about harmonising partnerships with the international community the federal government could send a message that the role of government is not paying a lip service to local governance. If there is mistrust between the Somali government and domestic stakeholders, there is little the international community can do to help Somalis gain from the renewed international commitment to helping Somalia to become a viable state again.
In 1991 when the military dictatorship was overthrown a civil war erupted in Somalia. Somalia’s armed opposition leaders did not address the clan-based identities of opposition groups since many clans did not have clan-based armed opposition groups. The opposition leaders knew the means to overthrow the dictatorship excluded many clans and paved the way for state collapse. The federal government will be making a similar mistake if it avoids an honest dialogue with domestic stakeholders and pins the blame for its shortcomings on the international community.
Liban Ahmad
libahm@gmail.com
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*Understanding Peacebuilding as Essentially Local
http://www.stabilityjournal.org/article/view/sta.as/39
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