Somaliland’s Demand of Recognition Unacceptable for the International Community by Abdirahman H.Ahmed Aden
Abdirahman H. Ahmed Aden
Xaadyey@yahoo.com
OPINION
In 1991, the Somali central government collapsed and the Somali civil war started as a part of armed militia group, called Somali National Movement declared independence for the North of Somalia, seceding from the rest of the country. In a conference held at Buroa, SNM forced the participants to declare unilateral secession from the nation, and branded the new local, separatist administration as Somaliland by referring to the colonial legacy that applied to Somalia’s North at the times of the English occupation, when the said territory was known as British Somaliland protectorate.
For no less than 22 years, the world has ignored Somaliland’s assertion of independence. As a national Somali Government is likely to come back, I would like to highlight few points about the Somaliland British protectorate territory, and examine why the new Somali Federal Government hesitated to eradicate the secessionist entity during the first six months of Hassan Sheikh’s tenure as head of state.
Somalis have lived in the Horn of Africa area since times immemorial, and their historical presence has been duly recorded in several nations’ texts. The Somali nation has shared the same culture and ethnic origin, the same identity and language, and since the arrival of Islam, the same religion. These are determinant elements to measure the Somali nation’s oneness, historical unity, and national indivisibility. The existence of several sultanates before the colonial domination does not change in anything the aforementioned. Several scholars established parallels that fully demonstrate that political division in pre-capitalist economy times does not involve national differentiation or lack of nation identity, solidarity and oneness. Italy before 1860 and Germany before 1870 are typical examples of nations that were politically divided without any hint at national differentiation. Wherever they lived, people were bound by a strong sense of solidarity and a vivid feeling of shared common identity that were stressed by the common culture, heritage, language, religion and geography. Just like the Germans and the Italians, the Somalis do have national identity.
In the last two decades of the 19th century, Somalia was divided among the Italians, the English and the Abyssinian colonial state, within the context of the Scramble for Africa. When the English occupied Berbera and through that city the rest of the Somali North, they signed a treaty with some local clans, therefore giving them preferential status over the rest, which ended in a serious problem, as it was part of the colonial policy ‘divide and rule’. In general, the English didn’t have much interest in the resources of the region but the purpose of the establishment of the protectorate was to safeguard the supply market route between India and East Africa. In addition, the English found that the region could become as a source of supply of the meat for their British Indian outpost in Aden; as it turned out, the surroundings of Berbera were named Aden’s Butcher’s shop.
It is widely known that the Somali North has been inhabited by five (5) tribal entities, and the large Gabooye community. However, only three among them, namely the Isaaq, the Isse and the Samaron, signed a treaty with England; these tribes are located in the western part of the Somali North.
On the other, the eastern part of the Somali North, which is known as Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn (pronounced: Ayn) was never occupied by the English, and it never became part of the colonial protectorate. Leading the African anti-colonial struggle, as soon as the English colonials set foot in Berbera and other parts of the Somali North, the Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn dervishes, under the masterful leadership of Mohamed A. Hassan, declared war to the occupying forces. The Somali Resistance struggle spread across Somalia, in the East, the South, and the West, which is today’s occupied territory ‘Zone 5’ of Ethiopia.
The epicenter of the anti-colonial resistance movement was the entire region of Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn. There were very heavy casualties on both sides, and to quench the resistance, English military aircraft bombarded the heroic Taleh (Taleex) and Mirashi forts as early as 1921. In that cruel and criminal operation, a great number of the local Dhulbahante were massacred and numerous properties destroyed and burned.
Following the events, the Dervish-ruled state of Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn was dealt with as a World War I defeated enemy state, and was therefore never considered as an integral part of the Somaliland protectorate. Quite contrarily, the occupied territory was dealt with animosity and vindictiveness.
Within the context of the aforementioned Anglo – Isaaq-Isse-Samaron treaty, there was no concern for, or mention of, the Somali inland regions. England already dismissed this perspective, when signing agreements with Abyssinia in 1897 and 1954. In February 1954, James Callaghan, Member of the House of Commons, asked Lennox Boyd, the Speaker, about the transfer of authority over Somali territory to Abyssinia that the English colonials effectuated at the time.
James Callaghan, who later became prime minister, said then: “How can an agreement be satisfactory under which a tribe grazes for part of the year on one side of an international frontier and for the other part of the year on the other side of frontier? If it is the case as I understand it is, that these Somali tribes challenge the agreement of 1897 and claim that their own agreement with Her Majesty’s government of 1884 overrides it, why should not Her Majesty’s Government themselves take the initiative in notifying the Ethiopian Government that the agreement has not yet come into force – it will not came into force until 28th February, next Monday, and that they themselves will postpone its operation until such time as the dispute about the two treaties (Anglo-Somali treaty 1884 and Anglo-Ethiopian 1897) has been referred to the international court of justice”?
Speaker Lennox Boyd responded to Hon Member James Callaghan that “every aspect of this problem was gone into most carefully during the negotiations and I am afraid that it is impossible to reopen them. {Hon. Members shouting ‘why’?} The Hon. Member said that it would be difficult to imagine tribes grazing for one part of the year on one side of an international boundary and for the other part of the year on the other side of boundary, but I think he is a little inclined to at the problems of Africa through the eyes of South Wales”.
Another debate, which was held in the English House of Commons in April 30, 1914, a Member of House of Commons, the Baron Alfred Emmott delivered a speech about the tribes who were under English protectorate and said “the noble Earl said a great deal about the treaties that have been made with the tribes; of course, those treaties do not cover the whole of Somaliland. They apply much more to one, the western portion than to the eastern. There were, as far as I remember, six treaties made altogether, and in four of those treaties the gracious favor and protection of Her Majesty was granted, to the tribes with the exception of the Warsangeli. All the tribes were more or less in the west, and the noble Earl I am sure is sufficiently well acquainted with the past history of Somaliland to know how the Warsangeli have carried out their share of the treaty with us and how we have carried out our share of the treaty with them, but the difficulty in Somaliland does not lie so much owing to the treaties we have made. It lies rather in the moral obligations which rest upon us with reference to tribes like the Dolbahanta (Dhulbahante) with whom I think I am correct in saying we have no treaty at all”.
?n 8 march 1905, the member of House of commons Lloyd George said that “there was the hon. Member for (the borough of) King’s Lynn behind them; they might have kept their pledges to him, and no one thought that would have cost —2,500,000. But having sworn to their own virtue, and having entered into treaties with the Dolbahantas and all these tribes, saying, ‘We will protect you at any cost’, they now declared, ‘We have come to the conclusion that it is too expensive to keep our word’. The hon. Member for King’s Lynn would have this satisfaction, that he was no worse off than the Dolbahantas tribes, except in one respect, that the Government were going to arm the Dolbahantas. What an extraordinary position”! Earl Percy said to George Lloyd “the Dolbahantas are not one of the tribes under our protection”.
If the Anglo – Isaaq-Isse-Samaron treaty was not broken by the English government
or if it was not disfranchised, but it covered the entire northwestern part of Somalia, then the entire area could claim their right to be part of the English Somaliland protectorate, thus including the Dervish state and Ogaden. But England had already ceded Somaliland to a third country (Abyssinia), and in the other hand, if the Anglo-Somali treaty covered only the coastline, we should wonder why the English destroyed the Dervish state, although they did not have the right to occupy their land and why the English handed Ogaden over to Abyssinia.
As it comes out of Somali historical documentation, the English protectorate of Somalialand was extended over only some specified tribal entities, namely Isse, Samaron, Habr,Garhajis, Habr Awal and Habr Tol-jelo that singed the aforementioned treaty with the English government. Quite contrarily, the Warsangeli Sultan signed an informal treaty later in Aden, and in any case, all these agreements reflect an independent approach whereby each tribal entity came at a time to sign a treaty; there was no intrusion or interference in the bilateral contacts that were established by the English government from one side and by each Somali Sultan (of Samaron, Habr Awal, Isse or Habr Garhajis) independently from the other side.
If the Anglo – Isaaq-Isse-Samaron treaties covered the whole area of the Northern Somali coastlines and the inland, there has to be an appeal to the International Court of Justice to review the treaties in relation with the Anglo-Abyssinian treaty and arbitrate about the validity of their contents.
The International Court of Justice, abiding by the principles they have declared as theirs, will have to issue a verdict forcing England to accept the return of the Abyssinia-controlled part of the Somaliland protectorate to the hands of the signatories of the Anglo – Isaaq-Isse-Samaron treaties. In addition, the legal status of the land of Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn will have to be spelled out clearly (whether it was part of the English protectorate or not), and any claims made by Somaliland will have to be dealt with on the basis of the International Law.
As a matter of fact, there has been a historical paradox, i.e. three types of territories associated with the colonial term ‘Somaliland protectorate’, namely
1. English Somaliland protectorate, in the North-western part of Somalia, from Zeila to Buroa (currently within the secessionist entity ‘Somaliland’),
2. English-defeated Somaliland, i.e. the Northeastern part of today’s Somaliland (the land of Sool, Sanaag and Cayn), and
3. English-ceded Somaliland, i.e. the Western part and confines of inland Somalia, which is called Ogaden (currently occupied by the Abyssinian colonial state and called ‘Kilil 5’).
In 1946, Ernest Bevin, the then English foreign minister, set a plan for a Greater Somalia (in Somali: Soomaali-weyn); this plan was met with opposition from different countries, notably the US, the Soviet Union, and France. The Americans felt that if all the Somalis were united in a state, they could be an important country within the British Commonwealth, and in this case, the benefit would go to the English, taking also into consideration the rumors about large quantities of Oil being available in the soil of the Horn of Africa. The Soviets wanted to avoid the transformation of colonialism in Africa into another scheme that would also be beneficial to the colonial powers, and the French viewed the Bevin plan as a direct threat against their presence in the part of Somalia that they controlled around the Bab al Mandeb straits of the Red Sea.
In this regard, it is noteworthy that in 1958, there was a speech given in the House of Commons in England by a member who said that “in 1947 the late Ernest Bevin had a scheme for this area; he wanted to unite all Somalis in one united Somalia. At this moment, what was formerly Italian Somaliland is due to get independence in 1960 and will of course get it. Many of the 2 million Somalis are there. Ernest Bevin wished to unite those 2 million with our 750.000, and obviously later with the Ethiopian Somalis perhaps with the French Somalis, if he could get consent to that form of a new nation in the Horn of Africa. Unfortunately, the Americans and Soviets, who met at New York at that time, did not assist the then English Foreign Minister in this plan, and it lapsed. What a pity that we did not carry on with it! There is no doubt that at the moment our prestige and our capacity for good will and influence in this part of Africa are slumping. The Ethiopians are appointing their own Akils (Caaqilo) or headmen among our Somalis –and indeed by gifts of land and other measures are persuading British Somalis to become Ethiopian citizens; others go over because of the lack of protection, which we are offering our people”.
He added the following: “In the Daily Mail last Monday, there was a statement to the effect that at Barnat castle, some commandos of the Burham light infantry were standing by, in case they had to be flown out to the border of Ethiopia, should a dispute flare up. The joint under-secretary may say something about that; I do not believe that it will be advisable to fly out the commandos. The late Ernest Bevin wished to do calling a conference with the French of Djibouti and the Italian at Mogadishu, our people from Hargeisa and the Ethiopians in Addis-Ababa. There might be a possible fifth party, the Americans, who have oil interest here and who alleged to have much influence with the Ethiopians because of their technical assistance, economic help and financial aid to Ethiopia. At such a conference, the future of the Somali people could be discussed. I am afraid that if we do not do something like that, soon in Somalia we will lose our present influence for good. The Somalis are intensely loyal and wish to stay in the Commonwealth, if and when they become united in the 1960s. I hope that suggestion will be considered and that Her Majesty’s government will attempt to hummer out what all the Somalis can do together in the 1960s”.
A repeatedly evoked argument in favor of an eventual recognition of the breakaway Somaliland state is that the British Somaliland protectorate had been recognized by thirty three (33) countries after it got independent in 1960; this is however wrong. In fact, there was no state established in the Somali North. The local people were merely waiting the independence of the Southern regions to be effectuated in what had earlier been the Italian colonial zone in Somalia and a parent state to be formed there.
As a matter of fact, the flag that replaced the English colonial flag in the Somali North was conceived and designed by a Southerner, Mohamed Awale Liban, and at that very moment, the entire Somali nation was without statehood status. Following the departure of the colonials, there was no union of two states, but a mere merge of two territories inhabited by different populations of the same nations. In 1961, the act of union was approved by two local parliaments impromptu formed at the time the colonials were preparing their departure. The effectuated union was a merge of two territories, not of two extant countries, not of two confederate entities. Somalia, as a newly emerged state in 1961, had nothing to do with cases like Sen-Gambia (Senegal and Gambia) or United Arab Republic (Egypt, Syria, & Yemen).
If there is a point to examine, as regards the post-colonial unification of Somalia, this is the reason for which autonomy was granted to the central and southern regions by the UN with a small delay while the northern regions were left without a proper administration and awaited for the other regions to be declared independent in July 1960. During that interlude, there was no state in the northern regions, only grassroots organizations and a certain number of unification committees.
What Modern Somaliland is – in brief?
In 1980, a group of Isaaq- Somali tribe of military officers and merchants met in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and made an oath to establish a rebel army against the national Somali government of Siad Barre; one year later, in 1981, they met in London and founded a new rebel group, which was named Somali National Movement (SNM). In the second meeting, representatives of Dolbahanta (Dhulbahante) led by late Garad Ali G. Jama, tried to join the SNM meeting, in order to reshape the campaign against Siad Barre government. However, the sectarian SNM leadership turned their suggestion down, saying to the Dhulbahante delegation that, although their stance was highly evaluated, the fight against Siad Barre had to be fought separately and that Dhulbahante had to set up their own rebel group and fight in their own region (Sool). Self-styled as a Jihadist group, SNM leaders insisted on their interest to exclusively defend their ‘Mecca and Medina’, as they described the northern Somali cities of Buroa and Hargeisa.
In 1986, supported by the USSR-backed, totalitarian, Mengistu regime of Abyssinia (Ethiopia), SNM rebels invaded these two cities; following this development, the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) hosted peace talks between Somalia and the regional trouble-maker (Ethiopia). As per the ensuing agreement, army battalions had to be withdrawn from both sides, and the Somali national army was ordered to enter these cities.
In 1988, SNM invaded again the cities of Hargeisa and Buroa. By reacting that action Somali army bombed on Hargeisa, On that occasion SNM massacred thousands of Ogadeni refugees who had fled from Abyssinian-occupied Somalia, e.g. Ogaden, and had precariously settled in several camps nearby Hargeisa. Several mass graves mendaciously publicized by the illegitimate government of Somaliland are indeed evidence of the Ogadeni refugee hecatomb; which was perpetrated by the Hargeisa-based gangsters who rule Somaliland.of course there was other people from Hargeisa Their self-styled president Ahmed Siilanyo explained in public how SNM took over Hargeisa and Burco under Abyssinian engineering and its well evidence that Siilanyo has committed a crime and he is the command responsibility of Hargeisa destruction as equal to Siad Government ; more light on this subject is available here: http://www.youtube.com/embed/mpZw-kRcPe8?feature=player_detailpage”
After the collapse of the national Somali government, SNM called for a conference at Buroa which was held in March – May 1991. In that event, SNM armed group declared their separation from Somalia; as president of the breakaway entity was appointed the former Somali ambassador to Abyssinia (Ethiopia) Abdirahman Ahmed Ali. The ignominious situation did not last much before fierce fighting took place in Berbera. Following the chaotic situation, a great conference was held at Boorame in 1993. The participants originated from diverse places of the Somali North’s western regions, mainly representing tribal entities, namely the Isaaq and the Samaroon. They then established a unicameral simulacrum of democracy and formed a government. Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, the last Somali premier prior to Siad Barre, became the president of the illegitimate entity, and Abdirahman Ahmed Ali moved back to Mugadishu, and having changed his mind, declared that Somaliland should reintegrate within a reconciled state of Somalia, something that Mohamed Egal opposed vehemently.
This announcement caused the death of many innocent people from Abdirahman Tur’s family that belongs to the clan of Habr Yunis. Following these killings, other similar atrocities took place, when no less than 4000 persons belonging to the clan of Habr Garhajis were massacred. However, the sub-clan Egal managed to establish a well-structured administration stretching between Buroa and Borame; quite thoughtfully, they did not interfere into the Sool, Sanag, and Cayn regions militarily
More recently, during the tenure of Dahir Rayale Kahin, and current Siilanyo the overall situation worsened and the region of Sool, Sanaag and Cayn became the center of twofold conflict. At the level of breakaway/autonomous -states’ rivalry, Puntland and Somaliland clashed over the said territory. At the level of local population, a fierce resistance to foreign occupation took place over the last two years, and this resulted in cruel oppression and repeated mass killings across the entire territory and with focus on the northern warfronts, Sool, and the district of Buhoodle.
In 2012, Somalia’s shift from the transitional governments to a national administration involved major challenges that may prove to be serious obstacles in the nation building effort; the challenges consist in terrorism and secessionism. There is no ethnic, religious or political background to Somalia’s secessionism; it’s mere tribalism, e.g. an evil that has no historical roots and cannot be beneficial in any sense. The Somali Federal Government vowed to remove any Terrorist group associated to Al Qaeda, but on the other hand, President Hassan announced that he will not put any diplomatic pressure to the secessionist group that wants to divide the country.
Representatives of the Somali government have already paid many visits to diverse parts of the country. President Hassan visited Baidaba and Beletweyne. Prime minister Saed moved independently to Beletweyne, Musamareeb, Cadaado, and Caabud-waaq. He also signed an agreement with Ahl us Sunaa w’ al Jamea, and gave them US $ 5 million as a recompense for having fought against the terrorist group of Al- Shabaab.
Meanwhile, in Zaila, i.e. the country’s northernmost area, the army of Somaliland repeatedly perpetrated terrible atrocities against the innocent local people, and the same occurred also in Xudun ( Huddun) area, in Erigavo and Buhoodle. The local population in those regions remained nationalist and unionist over the past two decades, and they are currently supporting fervently the federal government. Opposing their feeling, the current president and administration operate in a way that proves that they do not consider their authority as truly nationwide and that they do not hold that territory as rightfully being under their authority. They seem to recommend to these populations to accept the secessionist hegemony. This development will have an equivocal impact on the entire Hassan administration.
Despite all promises made by president Hassan Sheikh, it is quite possible that a negative scenario will develop, following the infiltration of the New Islah al Islami party that is currently misleading the federal government through disastrous advice; this party seems to have little understanding of Somalia’s geo-demographic segmentation. Through their advice, President Hassan activates a new the catastrophic clan antagonism that was the reason of all calamities befallen on Somalia; as a matter of fact, he seems to bring back to Somalia the spectrum of Mustaxeel (pronounced Mustahill).
Mustaxeel is actually a village located on the Ethiopian borderline. It is there that Gen. Mohamed Farah Aideed, leader of USC, and Abdirahman Ahmed Ali (also known as Abdirahman Tuur), leader of SNM, reached an agreement, back in 1989. That shameful agreement consisted in a real plot against the entire Somali nation, and it was made under the auspices of the cruel Abyssinian dictator Mengistu Haile Maryam. As per the agreement’s terms, Somalia would be divided between the two clan-based militias that would control two zones demarcated by a vertical line; as it happened, the entire area from Galka’ayo to the southernmost parts of Somalia was placed under USC control, whereas the regions from Galka’ayo to the northernmost confines of Somalia were conceded to SNM authority.
It thus become evident that the so-called National Stabilization plan represents nothing more than a revalidation of the Mustaxeel plot; to confuse the Somali public opinion, president Hassan Sheikh deploys a fruitless effort to prevent the formation of new states in Jubba and Bay-Bakool within the federal constitution but the attitude of his prime minister suggests otherwise. While passing from Galka’ayo, last March, Prime Minister Saed proposed high ranking officers of the Galmudug administration to join Cadaado or Himan iyo Heeb, instead of supporting the city’s status as a free passage city in Central Somalia and as home to patriotic Somalis who aspire to national pacification and reunification. Any discussion entertained by a Somali prime minister as regards the ‘correct’ place of Gaalka’ayo in either Galmudug or Puntland is misplaced and disastrous in current time.
In relation with the aforementioned, local sources interpret President Hassan’s new plans for a federal administration as a new method of division of the country; due to clannish interest, as a matter of fact, Gedo joined Bay-Bakook, the central regions formed another administrative area from southern Mudug to Hiraan, whereas the region between the two Shabelle rivers and Banaadir will form another administrative unit. Definitely Puntland will contain only Northern Mudug, Nugaal and Bari, whereas Jubba regions Hassan’s battle cry Stadium and th regions of Sool, Sanaag and Cayn will be included in Somaliland. As a matter of fact, President Hassan accepted to leave the region of Sool, Sanaag and Cayn out of his sphere of influence.
In the upcoming Somali conference at London, and Ankara communiqué in 13 April 2013 the Somali government is expected to recognize that Somaliland controls the entire northern region as a legitimate entity of former British colony.This is the reality of the current situation, and it matters very little if President Hassan confesses in public that he is striving to unite the country. By overestimating the possibilities of the ruling secessionist administration in Northern Somalia and by downgrading unionist communities in Awdal, Sool and Sanaag, President Hassan further damages Somalia’s chances to achieve peace and national unity.
Somaliland’s claim within the scope of international law
As per the declarative theory of Statehood, Somaliland’s secession and demand for recognition is illegal in every sense. The Montevideo convention on the Rights and duties of the States clearly stipulates, in the first article of the convention, that the state or region that is seeking to secede from its parent state must possess the following qualifications:
A. a local, permanent population,
B. a definite territory,
C. a local government, and
D. the capacity to engage in relations with other states
First of all, we should examine what a population is. As population is defined the totality of the people who live in a specific country or area; the population may contain one, two or more peoples of different ethnic origin if they truly agree to share their administration. Somaliland has failed to possess permanent population, because the local people must be an independent ethnic group; as example, we can mention the Yemenites who are the people of Yemen. So, we should now ask ourselves what the people of Somaliland are.
As people is defined a group of humans who share definitely objective criteria, like ethnicity, historicity, language, tradition, and religion. The inhabitants of Somaliland are not different from those residing in other parts of Somalia. As a matter of fact, they are Somalis, they have common historical past with all the other Somalis, they speak Somali language, and they are Sunni Muslims; so, they are not an independent, separate people, but part of the Somali people, and must therefore share the same state with all the other Somalis.
Furthermore, Somaliland failed to possess a definite territory, because the Hargeisa-based separatist group claims independence on the basis of the earlier existence of the English protectorate, but we don’t know where exactly where the Somaliland British protectorate’s borderlines. Closely examining the texts of the Anglo-Somali treaties, we reach the conclusion that there was not a clearly demarcated borderline to fix the confines of the protectorate. On the contrary, it becomes rather evident that the protectorate did not cover the area that the Hargeisa-based separatist group claims of its own. This consists in another failure of Somaliland to fulfill the criteria set by the Montevideo convention. It is therefore necessary to examine the case of the Anglo-Somali treaties and their nature more closely.
Prof. Antonello Tancredi argued that as per the principles of the International Law that address the procedure of the secession, the dynamics of the secession represents a process which potentially collides with the international rule at a higher position, as the International Law is designed to protect the common interest of the intergovernmental community. That’s why the secession dynamics must not threaten other national or sub-national interests of the parent state, and it must not be a violation to the established order within the international contemporary law.
Tancredi maintained that three procedural criteria must be met in International Law for a secession to be considered as legitimate.
First, the secession must occur without military aid from foreign states. Somaliland failed to meet this criterion because SNM gained military assistance from Ethiopia during the period 1982 – 1988.
Second, the local population of the seceding territory must democratically approve of the secession. Somaliland failed also to meet this criterion because, in 1991, SNM interfered with the conference in Buroa and forced the participants to declare an independent state from Somalia. In addition, soon afterwards, in 1994, when the Habr Garhajis, one of the constituent tribal entities in the Somali North, tried to withdraw from the unrecognized, breakaway state of Somaliland, the local army was sent to fight against Habr Garhajis and through dire bloodshed to impose on them the secessionist ideology of the illegitimate state.
Third, the secession must respect the principle of uti possidetis (‘as you possess’), which stipulates that the territory and other property remains with its possessor at the end of a conflict, unless otherwise provided for by a treaty. It is clear that this criterion cannot be met as long as the current Hargeisa administration remains in place.
Does breakaway Somaliland have the right to self-determination?
The right to self-determination is indisputably a norm of jus cogens (compelling law). Jus cogens’ norms are the highest rules of International Law and they must be strictly obeyed at all times. Both the International Court of Justice and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States have ruled on cases in a way that supports the view that the principle of self-determination also has the legal status of erga omnes, e.g. ‘towards all’. Accordingly, erga omnes’ obligations of a state are owed to the international community as a whole: when a principle achieves the status of erga omnes, the rest of the international community is under a mandatory duty to respect it in all circumstances in their relations with each other.
Consequently, as Somaliland failed to meet the procedural criteria that are required in International Law for a secession to be considered as legitimate, the principle of territorial integrity remains as an ‘erga omnes’ obligation of each and every state owed to Somalia, as a member of the international community.
Somaliland’s demand for recognition, if accepted, would consist in straightforward violation of Somalia’s territorial integrity in sheer opposition to the International Law. As the Hargeisa-based government and self-styled president are fully aware of this reality, they diffuse false stories about the hypothetically aggressive rule of Siad Barre administration or the inexistent genocide that Somalia’s last president supposedly perpetrated against the tribe of Isaaq. The last years of the said administration represent a period of upheaval when several atrocities took place; but the Somali government did not pursue oppressive practices against only the Isaaq but also Majeerten and other tribal entities in diverse provinces of the Horn of Africa country. As example, I can mention at this point the bombardment of Widhwidh, a town near Buuhoodle, by the Somali air-force in 1982, which was due to the hunt of Omar Mahmoud, a Majeerten leader, and many associated families that had to flee from Mudug to save their lives. This concludes the case of the Hargeisa-based group that falsely pretends that Siad Barre oppression was directed against the Isaaq exclusively.
In a well-known song, titled Dhawaaq Murugo (i.e. sorrow tone I don’t know the exact name of song ), Saado Ali Warsame, a high profiled Somali singer, has sung the sad story of agitations, murders and arrests that occurred against several tribal groups who was opposed Socialism Government in the days of Siyad Barre regime. The famous song, acknowledged for its strong verses, describes how military groups acting in the name of that regime persecuted respectful people such as Aden Abdulle Osman, first president of Somalia, Mohamed Awale Liban, the founder and designer of the national Somali flag, and Abdilahi Isse Mohamoud, the first prime minister of the trusteeship times.
All Somalis are fond of the famous verse sung by Saado ‘xalaan dhadhabbay oo Riyooday Dhawaaq murugaan Maqlaaayey’. The song can be heard here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oP2J0WS-uN0
I believe that Somaliland‘s secession will never be approved by the principles and the instances of International Law under any circumstances whatsoever. All the Somalis must therefore seriously examine all possible ways as to just how the Somali Nation will achieve rehabilitation and reunification without leaving any part in grief. In this regard, the case of example of Quebec, Canada’s French-speaking region, should be carefully observed and dully assessed.
Responding to demands for secession, raised by some separatist groups, the Canadian Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that, under the principles of the International Law, there is no clear right to unilateral secession for a fully recognized and accredited component of a state, like the French-speaking population of Quebec.
As per the Canadian Supreme Court’s deliberations, any demand for secession should be based on the principle of self-determination, and in this regard, the International Law stipulates in general that self-determination should be first implemented within the borders of an existing nation-state. In addition, the Canadian Supreme Court considered that, as per the concepts of the International Law, any recognition of the right to self-determination is accompanied by clear language protecting territorial integrity and stability of the sovereign state.
The Canadian Supreme Court concluded the deliberations as follows: ‘A state whose government represents the whole of the people or peoples resident within its territory, on a basis of equality and without discrimination, and respects the principles of self-determination in its own internal arrangements, is entitled to the protection under international law of its territorial integrity’.
The Canadian Supreme Court quoted Prof. Antonello Tancredi’s earlier publications as regards the ‘due process’ in the creation of states through secession, and drew the conclusion that the right has only been bestowed upon two classes of peoples: those under colonial rule or foreign occupation. The Canadian Supreme Court’s conclusion was based on the assumption that both classes make up entities that are inherently distinct from the colonialist power and occupant power and that their ‘territorial integrity’, all but destroyed by the colonialist or occupying power, should be fully restored.
In addition to the colonial rule or the subjugation, occupation, domination and exploitation outside a colonial context, the court identified no third reason for allowing external self-determination. With respect to Quebec’s demand for secession, the Canadian Supreme Court is clear: the right of colonial peoples to exercise their right to self-determination by breaking away from imperial power is undisputed within the context of International Law; it is however irrelevant to the demand submitted by the separatist groups of Quebec, because the said territory is clearly not under colonial domination. Finally, the Canadian Supreme Court concluded that Quebec had no right to secede under the International Law.
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