Why President Hassan’s unspoken strategies to revive a ‘centralised government’ in Somalia is an act of futile.
Said Faadi
said.faadi@gmail.com
June 20 2013
For a variety of reasons, it is an uphill task to revive the collapsed state of Somalia. Yet, the current Federal Government of Somalia (SFG) stood the best prospect for restoring the failed political institutions of Somalia. President Hassan got a golden opportunity to pull this war-torn nation out of the black hole into which it has fallen in 1991. He was given a chance to turn the page on the past and start writing history in a new chapter.
I am afraid President Hassan squandered an opportunity to become a national icon. Remember how Nelson Mandela became a hero. Unlike the painful struggle of the South African’s great statesman, President Hassan – through luck and little efforts – met his ‘stroke of luck’ at the doorstep. But I think it takes more than mere luck to become a hero. It requires intrinsic heroic trait.
If you objectively appraise the opportunity given to President Hassan against his achievements, you will sadly conclude that the man is an underachiever. Let me refresh your memories.
The successful closure of the protracted and painful transitional period to permanent Federal institutions has set off a spat of renewed hope, international attention and interest.
The diplomatic compassion in which President Hassan’s government obtained from the international community has been immensely overwhelming. The recognition and support given to the Federal Institutions by the member states of the European Union, Norway, the United States, Japan and other global and regional bodies including the Bretton Wood institutes (the World Bank and the IMF), the UN, the Arab Leagues, the OIC and the AU have been particularly very impressive.
Many trustingly believed that the international legitimacy of the government would usher in a new political dispensation that could take this war-ravaged nation across the bridge.
Unfortunately, this optimism is quickly ebbing out of sight. The enthusiasm and confidence people had for the new SFG leadership is undermined by the injudicious policies of the President. Misguided policies are escalating conflict and division among Somalis along tribal lines. Although the government is gaining a foothold in the diplomatic space, it is terribly – very terribly – failing to win the hearts and minds of its people.
Put differently, President Hassan is widely alleged to be a man pressing lopsided tribal agenda, rather than national goals.
Consequently, his government seems to have lost both legitimacy and momentum. Like this proverbial ‘headless chicken’, government ministers are moving all over the country to cause havoc. It is sad to know that a SGF minister has deliberately orchestrated the recent tragic incident in Kismayo – that saw the death of more than 50 civilians and innocent teenagers.
Let me tell you where the rain started beating the SFG. I don’t think the problem is the president per se. It is only the buck stops at him. The problem lies with the sad lot that forms his inner circle.
I think, dark forces within his political organisation are trying to manipulate ‘his’ opportunity to externalise the cost of a ‘tribal warfare’.
That is why President Hassan should be wary of what is going in Villa Somalia. He should act firm and fast to dismantle and distance himself from these dark forces. He should do something to redeem his tainted national image.
Just reflect how the pattern of politics in Somalia was taking shape since Mr. Hassan was elected president late last year. Dangerous tides of tribalism have gone up in the sky. Tribal figureheads, who purport to speak for “the government”, took centre stage of the national policies. Why president accepted such myopic groups to usurp his political agency is beyond me. That is not the end, there is more.
The government’s strategy of ‘political conflict’ is also increasingly motivating infamous warlords to return in the public sphere. Some of the most notorious warlords have resuscitated from the political oblivion. I think they have smelt blood. They are scheming to swoop in for the kill. They never miss an opportunity to drink from the blood of the innocent people.
The SFG made several strategic blunders that led to the prevailing political tribalism and warlordism. But none was more hurting than the government’s casual argument against the formation of Jubbaland. I will leave here why the casual argument of the SFG against the formation of regional administrations is untenable political hubris.
First, President Hassan’s reluctance to the formation of regional administration are not in consistency with the commitments made by Somali participants of 2004 Reconciliation Conference in Nairobi – which is the reference point of the current political settlement. Neither is it consistency with the decentralised governance structures enshrined in the provisional Constitution of Somalia.
Political rhetoric aside, senior aides that command the ears of the President do not believe – and will not allow for that matter – federalism to take effect in Somalia. They are hell-bent to reverse the political consensus – federalism – that anchors the current political set-up.
As they say actions speak lauder than words. All their actions are biased towards reviving highly centralised governance structure in Somalia. Even the executive powers which are – by design – expected to be shared between the President and the Prime Minister are concentrated in the office of the president. President Hassan’s grip on power is absolute. That is why he is the centre of gravity.
Of course, the President and his political ‘cogs’ are entitled on their opinion. And the applicability of federalism in the context of Somalia is legitimately debatable. But they should not try to force their opinion down the throat of the ‘rest’. That would be a risky strategy – one that can slide the country back into bloodshed. Of course, we have been there before. It is a no-go territory. We still bear the scars.
Second, notwithstanding the absence of a ‘central government’ is ultimately at the root of the crisis in Somalia, it is the revival of a ‘central authority’ that lies at the heart of the conflict. This is paradoxically puzzling – as ‘central government’ is both a solution to the crisis and the most obvious obstacle that makes a solution to the crises a bridge too far. Let me expound this a bit. .
The bitter experience of the Somalis from dysfunctional and often predatory ‘central governments’ instilled them with profound suspicion of the state’s ‘monopoly on the means of violence’. History has it that the state has long being used as a tool to dominate and maltreat political opponents in Somalia.
Examples abound. Late dictator General Mohamed Siyad Barre’s ‘reign of terror’ effectively utilised the state apparatus to humiliate and abuse the human rights of his political nemeses. His shock troops committed one outrage after another to destroy their property rights and restrict the political freedom of their people.
President Abdikasim Salad Hassan misused the mandate of his Transitional National Government to settle political scores with his opponents. He sponsored his own clan militia to expand the influence of his government, to loot, destroy property and use violence to inflicted significant pain on those who contested his rule.
The power struggle between President Abdillahi Yusif’s Transitional Federal Government and the Islamic Courts Union – compounded with the proxy war between Eretria and Ethiopia – almost send the country to hell in a handbasket. President Sharif Sheik Ahmed found himself in a minefield, planted by his “own men”. History has nothing significant to write about him.
This is not the time and place to unpick all historical events. The point here is that those who don’t learn from history are bound to repeat it. Put it differently, the bitter experience of the Somalis from the state’s ‘legitimate monopoly on the means of violence’ makes the revival of a ‘central authority’ a ‘zero-sum game’ – one that has winners and losers. None of the main political antagonists – or rival clans – is willing to lose the control of the state apparatus to a rival. That is why all previous efforts for restoring a ‘central authority’ in Somali have failed.
The intention of this article is not to proscribe a formula for success; it is rather to define the problem that impedes a solution for our political conundrum. However, once the problem is identified, the remedy suggests itself.
For that matter, I will end where I started. The restoration of centralised authority in Somalia is act of futile. We can’t just keep repeating the same mistake. We need to learn from our past – and correct our pitfalls. It is time to let go.
The author is a topical commentator.
Said Faadi,
said.faadi@gmail.com