Memorandum on the Key Issues that Threaten Political Stability in Somalia
Elders of Maakhir Community UK
OPINION
We, Maakhir community in UK, would like to point out the major issues that threaten the stability of Somalia and that may ignite a renewed civil war. These are:
Autonomous region of Jubaland State
• The new policy of the Federal Government to abort the federal system that brought it to power and replace it with a centralised system. The Stabilisation Plan of the Federal Government for the regions is a direct rule from the centre packaged as a form of federalism as suggested by the annexed comments.
• The Federal government’s opposition to the creation of the autonomous state of Jubaland. Since the election of the president and vice-president of Jubaland State, the rift between the Federal government and the regional leaders widened. The Federal Government is using every tool in the book including corruption to undermine the security and the political stability of the Jubaland State and to foment internal conflict among the clans of the area.
• The crux of the matter is whether the role of the federal government should be subordinate to the wishes of the people of the Jubaland State or whether the wishes of the people are subordinate to the wishes of the federal government. We think the wishes of the people of Jubaland State should be paramount. Therefore, the President and the federal government should respect the wishes of the people of Jubaland State and accept the election of the president and vice president of Jubaland State.
• The president acts as a clan leader rather than a national leader that led to the lack of support from other clans except his own. He claims that the Jubaland process was not inclusive, which is a code for including in the process the war lords who control lower Shabelle region and who are from Mudug & Galgudud regions.
• The communiqué of IGAD did not solve the problems relating to the region. On the contrary, the resumption of the civil war is becoming more likely by the pronouncements and actions of the Federal Government. For the first time the Federal Government is referred to as the Hawiye Government.
• Members of Parliament who support the government are presenting a motion calling for the withdrawal of Kenyan forces that are part of AMISOM from Kismayo. However, they have no objection to Ugandan, Burundian, Djiboutian and other forces under AMISOM in Mogadishu.
• The dispute relating to Jubaland has created a tension between Kenya and The Federal Government that led to the aforementioned motion. However, one must admit that Kenya and Ethiopia have a stake in stabilising Somalia to prevent the export of terrorist activities and other problems that threatening their security. The terrorist attack on a Kenyan Police Post on 25th May 2013 is an example.
• The controversy has diverted attention from driving Al Shabaab from the areas they occupy and allowed them to have a breathing space for regrouping. As a matter of fact the dispute has strengthened the Al Shabaab in a manner of speaking.
Constitutional Issues
• The Federal government’s non-adherence to the constitution signed by the stake-holders and approved by the National constituent Assembly on August 2012. There are claims that certain articles and paragraph are omitted, replaced or deleted. The president said that he is the guardian of the three Ds: Dalka (country), Dadka (the people) and Diinta (the religion). He did not mention the fourth D: Dostoorka (the constitution). Thus, it appears that he is not protecting the constitution that brought him to power and he is ready to tamper with it as claimed by Puntland.
• The Federal Government is engaged in illegal exploitation of the natural resources of the country, particularly oil & gas and fishery resources, which is a violation of the Constitution. The resources can be exploited when the Federal States are formed and revenue sharing and management of the natural resources and foreign aid is agreed upon by the Federal Government and the Federal States.
• The Presidents usurpation of the powers of the prime minister and the cabinet and acting as executive president. Ironically the parliament calls the prime Minister to answer questions about the activities of the President.
• All the clans are not represented in the federal institutions like the civil service, diplomatic service, military, police, coast guard and intelligence etc. The support of the Government is in the capital and its environments.
Partial Lifting of Arms Embargo
• The partial lifting of the arms embargo may embolden the extremists in Mogadishu to attack Jubaland. There claims that the Federal Government is organising militias, posing as Al Shabaab, to attack Jubaland and destabilise the Jubaland State.
• The guards at the presidential palace have been removed and replaced by members of the same sub-sub-clan of the president. It was reported that soon after the new presidential guard unit took over security, a cache of weapons were stolen the presidential palace in the dark of the night.
• The so-called National Army is composed of the militia of war lords, clan leaders and business men who are occupying the property of the people who fled from Mogadishu in 1991.
Political Reconciliation
• The federal Government put the political reconciliation process in the back burner and it is not addressing the looted private and public properties in Mogadishu and the looted plantations. If this issue is not addressed successfully, reconciliation is not possible.
• Mogadishu is dominated and controlled by one clan. The Mogadishu districts populated by the Reer Hamar are now ruled by the Hawiye clan. The Reer Hamar has no say in the running of Hamar Jajab, Shangani, Hamar weyn, Bayhani districts that they populated. The federal Government should do something about the exclusion of this group from the Local government of Banadir instead of worrying about the Jubaland State.
• The Lower Shabelle region is controlled by war lords from Mudug and Galgudud regions with the connivance of the Federal Government. This is also a source of tension.
• The rift is widening among the clans that may strengthen the hand of Al Shabaab to exploit these divisions to their advantage.
The Dialogue with the secessionist Somaliland
• The secession in the northern regions of Somalia is fuelled by the Isaaq clan and spearheaded by SNM elements. The other clans in the north are strongly opposed to the secession and are for the unity of Somalia.
• The representatives of Maakhir, Khaatumo and Awdal should have seats on the negotiating table in the subsequent talks.
• The dialogue should be conducted within the context of the territorial integrity, sovereignty, political independence and unity of Somalia.
The self-declared Somaliland is seeking a special status and if it is accorded that status without extending it to the other federal states like Puntland, it will open a can of worms or a Pandora box. There are other federal states like Puntland and Jubaland that have better claim for such treatment for the following reasons:
• Somaliland united with trusteeship of Somalia voluntarily in 1960 when the legislative assembly of the former British Somaliland passed the Law of Union between Somaliland and Somalia.
• The Sultanate of Majerteyn (Puntland State with the exception of Sanaag and Sool regions) signed protection agreement with Italy on April 1889.
• Italy declared Italian Somaliland (Banadir, lower and Middle Shabelle, Hiran, Bay and Bakool regions) as Italian protectorate on November 1889.
• The British Protectorate of Jubaland (Lower and Middle Juba and Gedo regions) was ceded to Italy in 1924 without in any way consulting the wishes of its inhabitants. It was administered as a separate territory called ‘Oltro Guiba’ for two years and was lumped with Italian Somaliland on July 1926.
• The Sultanate of Majerteyn was incorporated into Italian Somaliland by Governor De Vecchi who used force to lump it into the rest of Italian Somaliland on November 1927 without consulting the wishes of its inhabitants.
Puntland and Jubaland recognise the federal government and support the territorial integrity and unity of Somalia while the secessionists in self-declared Somaliland do not. Therefore, if the secessionists are accorded special status, one can understand and sympathise with Puntland and Jubaland reaction whatever that may be. It should be noted that Puntland and Jubaland have better claim to revisit the manner of their incorporation into Italian Somaliland than the self-declared Somaliland’s union with Somalia.
By the Elders of Maakhir Community UK
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